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Outlook 
                    and 
           appraisal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
As the Scottish economy emerges from 
recession a slowly strengthening recovery is 
threatened by the massive fiscal 
consolidation package introduced by the new 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
government in the emergency Budget of 
22nd June. We estimate that Scottish GDP 
growth will be 0.1% lower this year, 0.2% 
lower in 2011 and 0.1% lower in 2012 as a 
result of the additional fiscal tightening in the 
emergency Budget compared to the plans of 
the previous Labour government.  
 
Our central forecast is for GDP growth of 
0.7% this year, 1.1% in 2011 and 2.1% in 
2012. That should be compared with our 
February forecast of 0.6% this year, 1.6% in 
2011 and 2.2% in 2012. The changes 
introduced in the emergency Budget along 
with the postponement to 2011 of Scotland's 
share of the £6bn UK cuts introduced by the 
new government for 2010 and the fiscal 
tightening put in place in the March Budget of 
the Labour government, result in our central 
forecast for 2011 being 0.5% points lower 
than our forecast in February. This is despite 
the fact that wider economic forces driving 
recovery in 2011 are now considered to be 
somewhat stronger than was the case in 
February. On our low growth scenario, the 
economy teeters on the brink of recession for 
two years despite signs of stronger recovery 
worldwide. 
 
The consequential real cuts to the Budget of 
the Scottish Parliament and government of 
around 14% may result, other things equal,  
in up to 126,000 economy wide job losses by 
2014-15 comprising up to 90,000 in the 
public sector and 37,000 private sector job 
losses. However, if the resulting drop in 
demand and freeing up of resources leads to 
a moderation in Scottish real wages and 
lower purchased input  and output prices 
then there will be a "crowding-in" effect as 
private sector activity, especially,  benefits 
from improved competitiveness. In these 
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK quarterly GDP growth, 1998q2 to 2009q4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Scottish and UK services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q4 
 
 
Figure 3:  Scottish and UK manufacturing GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q4 
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Figure 4:  Scottish and UK construction GVA volume growth 1998q2 to 2009q4 
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circumstances of flexible wages and prices 
the shock will reduce jobs in the public sector 
by the slightly lower number of just under 
78,000 while private sector employment rises 
by nearly 14,000. The overall job loss is thus 
just above 64,000, about half that in the 
fixed-price case. There is a "crowding in" 
effect on the private sector, but it is 
insufficient to offset the loss of activity in the 
public sector. 
 
The potential cut to the Scottish Parliament 
and government budget is unprecedented. In 
such circumstances it is incumbent on the 
Scottish government to explore a range of 
options that can embrace cost savings and 
revenue raising as well as spending cuts. 
Moreover, the government will wish to 
identify those options that do the least 
damage to economic growth while preserving 
social justice. We hope that the Scottish 
Parliament and the wider public will have an 
opportunity to debate all of these options and  
build a countrywide consensus on the best 
way forward. 
 
 
 
Recent GDP performance 
GDP data for the Scottish economy for the fourth quarter of 
2009 became available in late April. The Scottish economy 
finally exited the recession in the quarter growing at 0.2%, 
but the return to growth in Scotland was weaker than the UK 
at 0.4%. - see Figure 1. It is worth noting that Scotland’s 
growth performance deteriorated relatively in the fourth 
quarter because in the third quarter the fall in GDP of -0.1% 
was a little better than the UK where the contraction was -
0.2%. 
 
In the 4th quarter 2009, the service sector – accounting for 
74% of overall GVA – came out of recession with output 
rising by 0.2% in Scotland but by almost 0.5% in UK – see 
Figure 2. Over the year to the fourth quarter service sector 
GVA fell by -3.6%, while the recession taken as whole led to 
fall of -4.76% in GVA compared to fall of -4.43% in the UK. 
 
The service sector continued to perform less well in 
Scotland than in the UK in the fourth quarter, but 
manufacturing (14% of GVA) again did better. In the fourth 
quarter Manufacturing GVA rose by 1.2% in Scotland 
against a rise of 0.8% in manufacturing in the UK - see 
Figure 3. The stronger manufacturing output performance 
was mirrored in the fourth quarter export figures, with 
Scottish manufacturing exports rising by 2.9% in real terms, 
after a rise of 1% in the third quarter but a fall of -10.1% 
over the year to the fourth quarter. 
 
The construction industry in Scotland continued to contract 
with GVA falling by -2.8% in the fourth quarter compared to 
a fall of 1% in the sector in the UK 
– see Figure 4. 
 
Within services, the main sectoral drivers of recovery in the 
fourth quarter were public administration, education & health 
(22% of overall GVA), hotels & catering (3% of GVA), real 
estate & business services (REBS) (18% of GVA) financial 
services (8% of GVA), and retail & wholesale (11% of GVA). 
The public sector grew by 0.2%, hotels and catering by 
1.5%, REBS by 0.7%, financial services by 0.7% and retail 
and wholesale by 0.1%. Financial services grew by 0.7% in 
Scotland compared to a fall of -0.8% in the sector in the UK 
– see Figure 5. This is the first time that positive growth has 
been recorded in the sector for 6 quarters. We must hope 
that this presages a sustained recovery in the sector in 
Scotland. Since UK financial services went into recession 
later than in Scotland we might expect the sector to come 
out of recession somewhat later than its Scottish 
counterpart. One service sector experienced negative 
growth in the fourth quarter: transport & communication (7% 
of GVA). GVA in transport & communication services was 
marginally negative at -0.0% in Scotland, whereas the 
sector grew by 0.6% in the UK.  
 
Manufacturing in Scotland continued its recovery still 
outperforming UK manufacturing. The main sectors driving 
the recovery and the stronger Scottish performance were 
electronics, other manufacturing,  paper, printing & 
publishing, transport equipment, and drink. Electronics 
(2.8% of GVA) grew by 6.6% in the quarter compared to 
growth of 2.3% in its UK counterpart.  Other manufacturing 
(1.7% of GVA) grew by 3.7% whereas the sector contracted 
by -0.6% in the UK. Paper, printing & publishing (1.4% of 
GVA) grew by 1.5% compared to a contraction of -1% in the 
sector in the UK. Transport equipment (1% of GVA) grew by 
3% but this was much less than the growth of 8.3% 
recorded by transport equipment in the UK, which has now 
been growing for three successive quarters. Finally, the 
drinks industry (1.6% of GVA) continued to grow in the 
quarter with growth of 2.1% while the sector in the UK 
expanded by 0.3%. 
 
Other Scottish manufacturing sectors either failed to recover 
or remained weak. The chemicals industry continued to 
display negative growth in Scotland with output falling by -
1.9% in the fourth quarter compared to growth of 0.2% in 
the sector in the UK. Over the year, output in the sector has 
fallen by nearly 20% and our hope that the significant 
contraction in output experienced in the 3 quarters to 
2009Q3 had ceased has not been realised. Mechanical 
engineering reduced its output by -1.2% in the quarter a 
weaker performance than the rise of 2.5% experienced in 
the sector in the UK. The metals sector (1% of GVA) 
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Figure 5:  Scottish and UK financial services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2009q4 
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suffered a significant contraction of -8.9% compared to a 
rise of 0.7% in the UK. The sector has contracted by -10.4% 
in Scotland over the year. Finally, Food (1.4% of GVA) cut 
back production by -1% in Scotland, although this was 
better than  the -2.4% reduction in output in the UK. Over 
the year the food industry in Scotland contracted by -1.7%, 
broadly similar to the fall in output in the sector in the UK. 
 
Figure 6 charts the performance of key Scottish sectors over 
the past 12 years. The chart 6 indicates that all key growth 
sectors have been affected by the recession with the 
exception of the public sector. But most sectors are now 
recovering.   One other point worthy of note is that some 
sectors have experienced a double-dip recession: transport 
& communication, REBS, other services, and chemicals.  
 
Recent survey evidence 
The GVA outturn data for the fourth quarter 2009 suggest 
that the Scottish economy is recovering from recession but 
at a slower pace than the UK. On top of this, as the Review 
of Business Surveys below notes, the interpretation of 
recent surveys is more difficult than usual. This is due to the 
effects of the unduly harsh winter, especially in Scotland, 
the re-introduction of the 17.5% VAT rate at the start of 
2010, the ending of the car 'scrappage' scheme, and the 
effects on travel and trade of the volcano eruption in 
Iceland.  
 
Almost all surveys report rising confidence, output and 
exports in Scottish manufacturing. Of the monthly surveys, 
the Bank of Scotland PMI was the most positive suggesting 
an acceleration in recovery right across the private sector. 
Furthermore, the Bank of Scotland Index of Leading 
Indicators similarly anticipated further recovery in GDP in 
ensuing quarters. However, the CBI survey - to end April - 
while anticipating rising output and orders, noted that 
uncertainty about future demand was  likely to limit capital 
spending over the next twelve months. And the Scottish 
Chambers Business Survey highlighted the uncertainties 
posed by weak consumer spending, rising transport and 
energy costs, Government fiscal and monetary policies, 
especially the anticipated public spending cuts after the May 
election. Clearly, the strength and extent of the recovery 
from the recent major recession is by no means certain. 
 
 
Forecasts 
The Scottish economy came out of recession in the fourth 
quarter of last year with the recovery seeming weak over the 
winter months. The Forecasts of the Scottish Economy 
section of the Commentary below notes some evidence of 
recovery in nominal household expenditure and at a faster 
rate than we were predicting in February. This may in part 
be bolstered by evidence of gradually increasing activity in 
the housing market and some pick up in house prices. But 
housing market activity - lending for purchases, and house 
sales - remains weak. Retail sales growth is also not strong 
with the Scottish Retail Consortium reporting in June that 
like-for-like sales in May were 0.8% lower than in May 2009, 
when they had fallen 1.2%, the worst performance for 
almost 9 years. The comparable UK data indicated a rise of  
0.8%. From this survey consumer confidence appears lower 
in Scotland than in the UK. 
 
The supply of bank credit remains hesitant. Official Bank of 
England data for the UK released at the end of May reveals 
that M4 lending fell by 0.4% in April, with the twelve-month 
growth rate positive but falling to 2.8% from 3.2% in March. 
The Financial Stability Report, June 2010 from the Bank of 
England indicates that UK banks have increased their 
resilience with average capital ratios now at their highest 
levels for more than a decade while leverage has declined 
considerably. The Bank rightly notes "There is a risk that 
banks alleviate their own funding pressures by further 
constraining credit conditions for customers. That would 
dent economic recovery and so raise credit risk for all 
banks." (page 10). Sovereign debt risk for the banks has 
also risen appreciably due to the Greek crisis as fears of 
spillover to other countries rose. A generalised retreat by the 
banks from risk-taking would put further pressure on the 
recovery. 
 
Recovery in Scottish economic growth and jobs is also 
much dependent on growth in our major markets: the rest of 
the UK, mainland Europe and the US. Recovery in mainland 
Europe remains weak and this may be exacerbated by fiscal 
consolidations in Germany and other major economies. But 
the IMF is forecasting a significant pickup in world trade in 
2010 and 2011 from a fall of -11% in 2009 to increases of 
10.6% in 2010 and 8.4% in 2011. Tourism demand remains 
weak. Some pick up may be expected in 2010 due to the 
lower sterling exchange rate although recent increases may 
dampen that effect. We anticipate that tourism spending will 
remain flat in 2010 returning to growth in 2011 and 2012. 
 
Investment was badly hit during the recession but business 
investment in the UK had begun to rise again at the 
beginning of the year. Clearly, the pace of recovery in 
investment demand will not only be driven by the expected 
growth of the demand for goods and services but also the 
availability and price of credit. Confidence remains weak in 
Scottish construction where much investment activity 
occurs. But we do expect investment to recover appreciably 
from the large contractions seen in 2009 but positive growth 
will not appear until 2011 and 2012. 
 
In many respects the 'elephant in the room' affecting our 
forecasts for aggregate demand and GDP is the outlook for 
government spending. We note the expected scale of the 
spending adjustment below. Through cuts in spending on 
services, welfare benefits, cost savings  and tax increases 
the government is seeking to rebalance the economy away 
from government consumption and debt. Government 
consumption will according to the OBR contribute -0.5% 
points to UK GDP growth between 2011-2015 compared to 
+0.5% between 2000 and 2008. But the contribution of 
private consumption is forecast to be +1.2% points per 
annum compared to +1.7% between 2000 and 2008. This, 
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as Martin Wolf points out in the Financial Times 
(25/06/2010), amounts to a significant increase in the 
contribution of net exports and investment to realise the 
OBR forecasts for the period. Specifically, the OBR predicts 
that net exports and investment will contribute +0.7% points 
and +1.2% points per annum respectively in the 2011-2015 
period compared to +0.3% points and +0.5% points in the 
2000-2008 period. It might be achieved but it poses a big 
challenge for the economy. 
 
Against this background we are now assuming stronger 
household spending growth than we had assumed in the 
central forecast for February, export growth to the rest of the 
world is now significantly higher than previously assumed, 
while the growth of government spending is weaker. 
 
GVA forecasts 
The key forecasts for GVA/GDP are summarised in Table 1 
along with our February forecasts for comparison. We shall 
primarily focus on our central forecast here. Scotland is 
forecast to return to positive growth in 2010. But the 
recovery over the year is weak, household spending 
strengthens and by more than we forecast in February but 
increases only slightly this year. Exports to the rest of the 
world continue to recover and at a faster rate than predicted 
in February. This along with some recovery of investment, 
helps raise the forecast to 0.7% growth compared to our 
prediction of 0.6% in February. Recovery is weaker in 
Scotland than the OBR's forecasts for the UK and the 
median of independent, private and institutional forecasts for 
the UK, for the reasons that were well rehearsed in previous 
Commentaries and we see no basis for altering that view. 
Scottish GVA growth is better than the UK in 2010 on the 
High growth scenario only. Trend growth is realised on our 
Central scenario in 2012  but there is a high degree of 
uncertainty surrounding our 2012 forecasts because of the 
large unknowns determining the consequences of the fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
We have incorporated the decisions on government 
spending and tax in the emergency Budget into our 
forecasting model. The most significant changes affecting 
our forecasting horizon to 2012 are the increase in VAT to 
20% and the additional cuts in government spending to that 
date. IFS analysis indicates  that by 2012 less than half of 
the cumulative fiscal consolidation planned for 2015-16 will 
be in place.  Taken together the consequences of the 
measures in the Budget lead to our GVA forecast being 
revised down by 0.1% points  in 2010, 0.2% points in 2011, 
and  0.1% points in 2012 compared to what it would 
otherwise have been. These changes along with the 
postponement to 2011 of Scotland's share of the £6bn UK 
cuts introduced by the new government for 2010 and the 
fiscal tightening put in place in the March Budget of the 
Labour government, result in our central forecast for 2011 at 
1.1% being 0.5% points lower than our forecast in February. 
This is despite the fact that wider economic forces driving 
recovery in 2011 are now considered to be somewhat 
stronger than was the case in February. 
Employment  forecasts 
The key employment forecasts are summarised in Table 2. 
Job losses continue from 2009 into 2010, with a net  82,000 
jobs lost in those two years and still not fully matched by job 
gains of 51,000 in 2011 and 2012. At the sectoral level, the 
service sector experiences the greatest decline in jobs in 
2009 and 2010 with under 47,000 net jobs lost. With 
recovery the net gain in jobs in 2011 and 2012 of 20,000 
means that it will take some time for services to recover 
2008 jobs levels. Construction job losses amount to around 
18,500 over the two years and as with services the number 
of construction jobs in 2012 remains below 2008 levels but 
there is recovery in 2011 and 2012 of more than 3,000 jobs. 
Finally, the production sector which principally includes 
manufacturing sheds around 13,000 jobs in 2009 and 2010 
but through strong export growth net job creation in 2011 
and 2012 is nearly 25,000. 
 
Unemployment forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
3. On our Central forecast  ILO unemployment is expected 
to peak at 228,000 or 8.9% this year falling to just under 
224,000 or 8.7% in 2011 and further to 211,000 or 8.1% in 
2012. Of major importance to the outcome for 
unemployment is not simply output and employment change 
but also the change in inactivity. That is, the extent to which 
people losing their jobs cease to look for work and so move 
into inactivity rather than unemployment. Recent changes in 
inactivity are documented in the Overview of the Labour 
Market section of the Commentary below. The rate of 
inactivity appears to have risen during the recent recession 
by 1.6% points in the last year, to stand at 21.7% for 
working age people. 
 
 
Fiscal consolidation and the Scottish 
economy 
The Chancellor's emergency Budget  was unprecedented 
both in terms of the scale and nature of the fiscal adjustment 
proposed. The scheduled adjustment is significantly greater 
than that planned by the previous Labour government. The 
Labour Chancellor, Alastair Darling had aimed to achieve a 
small, 0.7% of national income, surplus on the cyclically-
adjusted current budget by 2014-15. In the light of forecast 
growth and expected revenues, the Labour government had 
announced a fiscal tightening amounting to £51bn per year 
by 2014-15. Within this total, cuts - largely unspecified - of 
£33 billion were scheduled alongside tax increases of 
£18bn: a two to one ratio. The publication of the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR) first set of official forecasts for 
the public finances and the economy in mid June, revealed 
that the growth outlook for the UK economy was judged to 
be weaker than forecast by the previous Labour 
government. This meant that a greater fiscal consolidation 
was required to achieve sustainable public finances than 
that targeted by the previous Labour government. Against 
this background, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 
estimated that replicating labour's 0.7% surplus goal would 
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Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA growth in three scenarios, 2009-2012  
 
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
     
High growth           -4.9 1.4 2.1 2.8 
    February forecast -4.7 1.7 2.2 2.8 
 
Central 
 
          -4.9 
 
0.7 
 
1.1 
 
2.1 
    February forecast -4.8 0.6 1.6 2.2 
 
Low growth 
 
          -4.9 
 
0.0 
 
0.1 
 
0.7 
    February forecast -4.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.8 
 
 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish net jobs growth in three scenarios, 2009-2012 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
High growth -48,847 -20,399  
 
35,142  
 
53,059  
 
February forecast -60,488 -9,785 30,253 57,213 
 
Central  
 
-48,847  
 
 
-33,546  
 
 
14,856  
 
 
36,111  
 
February forecast  -64,218 -32,264 18,277 44,612 
 
Low growth 
 
-48,847  
 
 
-48,129  
 
 
-6,036  
 
 
6,615  
 
February forecast -77,861 -57,002 -16,538 13,631 
 
 
 
Table 3:  ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the 
three forecast scenarios 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
ILO unemployment rate 
High growth 7.8% 8.4% 7.4% 6.2% 
Central 7.8% 8.9% 8.7% 8.1% 
Numbers 202,021 227,820 223,646 210,749 
Low growth 7.8% 9.5% 10.1% 10.7% 
     
Claimant count rate 
High growth 4.7% 5.0% 4.4% 3.9% 
Central 5.0% 5.3% 5.5% 5.1% 
Numbers 138,147 145,143 152,935 144,115 
Low growth 5.3% 5.6% 6.0% 6.8% 
 
 
require a further fiscal tightening of £34bn bringing the total 
to £85bn or 5.7% of national income. In the event 
Chancellor Osborne 's emergency Budget was even more 
restrictive with the planned adjustment amounting £113bn 
by 2014-15, more than 6% of national income. 
Our forecasts in the previous section embraced the 
consequences for growth and jobs of this overall fiscal 
adjustment to 2012 within the context of other changes in 
the determinants of aggregate demand and supply over the 
forecast period. In the section below we report on our 
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modelling estimates of the possible consequences for public 
sector output, jobs and the wider Scottish economy by 
2014-15 of that part of the fiscal consolidation that lowers by 
14% the department expenditure limit (DEL) of the Scottish 
Parliament and government. In other words, other parts of 
the fiscal consolidation: tax rises and benefit cuts are 
ignored, and everything else is held constant i.e. no other 
changes in the wider economy are allowed such as 
technical progress and productivity change. 
 
But before we discuss these estimates it is worth rehearsing 
the options that are available to governments when faced 
with the need for a significant fiscal consolidation. This is not 
simply an academic issue now that the broad thrust of the 
UK cuts have been announced because the Scottish 
government has still to acknowledge publicly  how it will 
respond to the likely cut in the budget assigned to the 
Scottish Parliament by the UK government. And indeed, the 
full scale of the fiscal consolidation facing Scotland will not 
be known until the Comprehensive Spending Review 
findings are published by the UK government on October 
20th of this year.  
 
Policy Options  
The UK government aims to reduce net borrowing from 11% 
of national income in 2009-10 to 1.1% in 2015-16. Within 
overall net borrowing it seeks to reduce the structural 
(cyclically adjusted) deficit from its 2009-2010 level of 8.4% 
of GDP to 0.3% by 2015-16. This is a massive exercise, 
with significant ramifications right across society. A clear 
consideration of the options available is imperative for both 
the UK and Scottish governments. In the UK this process 
had begun with emergency Budget and will continue in the 
Comprehensive Spending Review. In Scotland the 
Independent Review of spending chaired by Crawford 
Beveridge is due to report on spending options. It is to be 
hoped that the Scottish Parliament and the wider public will 
have an opportunity to debate not just spending options but 
some of the other options discussed below. 
 
Figure 7 reveals the broad category options that face 
governments wishing to undertake a fiscal consolidation. 
Put simply, the deficit can be reduced by a mix of spending 
cuts, revenue raising actions and cost savings. Cost 
savings, in principle, preserve outputs but reduce input 
costs. Spending cuts cut both inputs and outputs. Most of 
the UK debate has focused on the balance between 
spending cuts and tax rises with some efficiency savings 
also programmed. The Coalition's plans put a greater 
emphasis on spending cuts with an overall ratio a little 
below four to one (77% to 23%). Figure 7 shows is that 
there are other options to add in to the mix.  
 
Revenue raising can be secured by higher charges, asset 
sales and, of course, tax increases. However, asset sales 
do not reduce spending, or raise revenue recurrently, except 
marginally on outlays such as maintenance following a 
housing stock transfer; they are strictly a one-off exercise. 
Higher charges do not apparently promise much by way of 
increased revenue but they are clearly an option that should 
not be ruled out. Switzerland is one country that has 
ostensibly low tax rates but this is combined with a charging 
regime that is much more pervasive than in the UK, or many 
other countries. The Scottish government's revealed 
preference of reducing or removing charges - bridge tolls, 
student fees, prescription charges, travel concessions, care 
for the elderly - however merited, would appear to make it 
more difficult for the government to go back down this route. 
Finally, on revenues, while a debate is developing in 
Scotland about the case for further fiscal devolution and 
even full fiscal autonomy it is worth emphasising that under 
present powers the Scottish government has the option of 
raising income tax by up to 3p, which would raise more than 
£1bn. There would clearly be reasoned opposition to such a 
suggestion but it shouldn't be excluded as a potential option 
simply because of that. Much the same argument can be 
applied to business rates, which are also set by the Scottish 
government. 
 
Cost savings are also possible and can be sizeable as is 
evident from the programme of public sector pay cuts 
introduced by the Irish government. Similarly, the UK 
government plans to freeze for two years the pay of public 
sector workers with salaries above £21,000 per year. 
Efficiency savings are realised by 'doing things better'. Such 
savings  may not only be secured by enhanced efficiency in 
public sector production and/or delivery of services but by 
selective transfer of production and/or delivery to private 
sector entities though  funded by the tax payer. The CBI has 
recently made proposals along these lines and the new 
Westminster Education Secretary's secondary school 
proposals are of this type, reflecting Swedish experience. In 
the latter case, the philosophical underpinning of the 
proposals is that outcomes may be better at given (or less) 
cost rather than a simple cost cutting exercise. The so-
called 'shared-services agenda' at the local government 
level, as pioneered in the recent Clyde Valley Review 
chaired by Sir John Arbuthnott,  is one way forward to make 
costs savings while preserving services. There would 
appear to be many other opportunities in both local and 
central government for making efficiency savings through 
the realisation of economies of scale and other efficiencies 
as the recent (March 2010) Advice Paper prepared by the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh and submitted to the Scottish 
Parliament's Finance Committee makes clear.  For example, 
we can begin the process by raising the issue whether  
sufficient cost savings can be achieved by further 
collaboration and efficiency savings, a strategy noted by the 
Society of Local Authority Chief Executives in their report 
‘After the Downturn’ and by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers in Scotland Annual Report 2009/2010, or should 
Scotland consider more radical options such as the merger 
of councils, polices forces and other public agencies? 
Several other questions could be posed in a similar vein.  
 
Pages 4-15 
 
Figure 7:  Fiscal consolidation options 
 
 
     
Finally, a reduction in input prices if the state exerts its 
power as monopoly buyer may bring some savings for the 
public sector if not for the economy as a whole.Nothing in 
this discussion is meant to pretend that spending cuts and 
tax rises are not the principal route to fiscal consolidation in 
the UK . But the issues determining the choice of options 
are more than simply fiscal efficacy. Political, social justice, 
income distribution and economic growth implications all 
need to be considered. Different governments may put a 
different weight on these objectives. Both the previous 
Labour government and the Conservative/Liberal Democrat  
coalition have vowed to ring-fence spending on the NHS, 
and international development aid. As the Emergency 
Budget revealed, the impact of the cuts on the other 
spending departments in London has been that much 
greater, up to 25% depending on the eventual scale of 
welfare benefit cuts. The IFS note that the cut in DELs born 
by unprotected departments would rise to 33% if the cuts on 
the schools and defence budgets are restricted to 10% by 
2014-15.The Coalition has also been at pains to highlight 
the income distributional consequences of its programme for 
fiscal consolidation, highlighting the extent to which the 
burden of the adjustment falls more on high income 
households. The IFS, however, disputes this if the 
Coalition's additional fiscal consolidation measures are 
considered separately and when you look past 2012-13 
when benefit cuts start to bite. 
 
On top of this is the implication of the fiscal adjustment for 
the level and growth of output in the economy. Empirical 
research by Alesina & Perotti in 1996
1
, recently updated and 
confirmed by two Goldman Sachs economists Broadbent & 
Daly, highlights the importance of the balance between both 
spending cuts and tax rises and between certain types of 
spending cut. Specifically,  Alesina & Perotti conclude that 
"..fiscal adjustments that rely primarily on (current) spending 
cuts on transfers and the government wage bill..." were 
more successful in reducing the budget deficit and debt to 
GDP ratio. However, "....fiscal adjustments relying primarily 
on tax increases and cuts in public investment tend not to 
last and are contractionary." These findings offer some 
support for the Coalition's policy of weighting spending to 
tax cuts on a 4 : 1 basis. And these findings may even be 
reinforcing the government's willingness to take risks with 
the reduction in the demand for goods and services from the 
public sector in precipitating a double-dip recession. In other 
words, the research is not inconsistent with the view that the 
private sector will quickly pick up the released resources as 
long-term bond yields and the exchange rate falls. But it 
must be questioned how relevant such empirical research is 
to the present conjuncture with high levels of 
unemployment, a sizable output gap, structurally weak bank 
lending, historically low interest rates and a low sterling 
exchange rate. However, there may be more general 
agreement that cuts in public investment, while superficially 
attractive from a political standpoint with its reduced 
implications for current service provision and perhaps for 
jobs losses, could very well be damaging to economic 
growth. Hence, the previous Labour government's emphasis 
on cuts in investment in its fiscal consolidation plans, largely 
adopted by the present government, is to be regretted. 
 
From the above discussion it is evident that the Scottish 
government has a range of options before it in the difficult 
Scale of Fiscal Adjustment
Cost  Savings Spending Cuts Revenue Raising
Input 
prices
Efficiency
savings
Pay freeze 
or cuts
Asset 
sales
Higher 
charges
Tax 
rises
Demand and Supply in Economy
GDP, jobs and prices
Government
Local Central
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Table 4: Change in sectoral jobs and GVA by 2015 following 14% Scottish DEL cut 
 
 
 
 JOBS GVA/GDP % 
 Fixed Price Flex Price Fixed Price Flex Price 
Agriculture -374 562 -1.1 0.9 
Forestry -14 66 -0.5 1.8 
Sea fishing -4 98 -0.1 2.4 
Fish farming -1 30 -0.1 1.9 
Other mining and quarrying  -45 47 -1.8 1.2 
Oil and gas extraction  -94 456 -0.4 1.3 
Mfr food, drink and tobacco  -408 733 -0.9 1.1 
Mfr textiles and clothing  -101 174 -1.0 1.5 
Mfr chemicals etc  -108 166 -0.9 0.9 
Mfr metal and non-metal goods  -400 927 -0.9 1.8 
Mfr transport and other machinery, elec  -181 1,048 -0.3 1.2 
Other manufacturing  -702 511 -1.9 1.1 
Water  -207 -95 -4.9 -1.8 
Construction  -5,003 667 -3.5 0.4 
Distribution  -13,974 2,168 -2.6 0.2 
Transport  -1,390 1,963 -1.5 1.9 
Communications, finance and business  -13,514 3,979 -2.8 0.4 
R&D  -384 -53 -4.2 -0.6 
Education  -17,959 -14,977 -9.1 -7.4 
Public and other services  -71,009 -62,817 -10.8 -8.8 
Coal extraction -30 22 -2.5 1.7 
Oil refining and distribution  -36 16 -1.9 0.4 
Gas supply -69 -1 -3.4 -0.2 
Electricity - Renewable (hydro and wind  -27 14 -2.4 0.5 
Electricity - Non-renewable (coal, nuke  -205 120 -2.4 0.8 
Total -126,240 -64,178 -4.2% -1.6% 
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decisions it is going to have make in response to an expected 
large cut in the assigned budget from Westminster. In 
addition, there is some, all be it limited, evidence on 
outcomes, not least the economy-wide implications of 
spending cuts that we present below. We hope that the 
Scottish Parliament and the wider public will have an 
opportunity to debate all of these options and build a 
countrywide consensus on the best way forward. 
 
Impact of cuts in the Scottish DEL  
We use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model 
parameterised on Scottish data to identify the impact on the 
Scottish economy of the anticipated cuts to the Scottish 
departmental expenditure limit or DEL by 2014-15
2
. The 
anticipated reduction in Scottish DEL is taken to be a 14% 
real cut, which is the average cut to the UK DEL as estimated 
by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) in their post 
emergency Budget analysis
3
. The size of the actual reduction 
is unlikely to be known until the publication of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review on October 20th. It may 
differ from 14% somewhat depending on relative size of the 
cuts borne by the comparable programmes that drive the 
Barnett formula which allocate the assigned budget to the 
Scottish Parliament and the cuts borne by reserved 
programmes. 
 
The CGE model captures the linkages between industries 
within Scotland and between purchasers of goods and 
services, including government, produced by industries in 
Scotland. The model also allows for flexibility in prices, 
especially wages through local bargaining, and so we offer 
two simulations: a fixed-price analysis, where the cut in DEL 
leads to a straight reduction in the demand for goods and 
services produced in the Scottish economy; a flex-price 
analysis, where wages and output prices respond to changes 
in demand. To a certain extent these two simulations can be 
viewed as limiting cases defining the likely limits of the 
economy-wide impacts. 
 
A summary of the results is presented in Table 4. In the fixed-
price case, the DEL cut leads to a fall in the demand for 
goods and services in the public sector and in the wider 
economy in sectors that are either directly or indirectly linked 
to the public sector though purchases of inputs or the 
spending of wages and salaries. The result is output and job 
losses in both public and private sectors. By 2014-15, public 
sector job losses amount to nearly 90,000, while private 
sector job losses stand at nearly 37,000, an overall job loss of 
126,000, a reduction in GDP of -4.2% and a fall in investment 
of -2.9%. 
 
In the flex-price case, the reduction in demand from the public 
sector will cause real wages and intermediate input prices to 
fall below what they otherwise would be. This would lower 
production costs in Scottish industries, improve 
competitiveness and lead to an increased demand for goods, 
services and employment, especially in the private sector, on 
that account, which may serve to offset the loss of demand 
from the public sector. The improvement in economy-wide 
competitiveness could, in principle, offset the reduction in 
output and jobs in the public sector as well. In the event our 
model estimates that the shock will reduce jobs in the public 
sector by the slightly lower number of just under 78,000 while 
private sector employment rises by nearly 14,000. The overall 
job loss is thus just above 64,000, about half that in the fixed-
price case. The fall in GDP is -1.6% more than a third of the 
loss in the fixed price case. In addition, investment falls by -
0.7% but exports rise by 2.1% because of improved 
competitiveness There is a 'crowding in" effect on the private 
sector, but it is insufficient to offset the loss of activity in the 
public sector. 
 
Table 4 also provides a more detailed breakdown at the 
sectoral level of the DEL cut. In the fixed price case, the 6 
manufacturing sectors lose 1,900 jobs but gain 3,559 jobs due 
to improved competitiveness in the flex price case. The 
construction sector loses -5,000 jobs in the former case but 
gains 667 jobs in the latter case. The much larger private 
service sector, loses 28,878 jobs when there is only a 
demand reduction effect of the DEL but if regional wages and 
prices also adjust across the economy then there are net job 
gains in the sector of 8,110. 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
27 June 2010 
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competitiveness effects. 
 
3
Rowena Crawford “Public services serious cuts to come” IFS, 23 
June 2010.. 
